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Abstract
Ilarsanyi and Selten (198ë) propc~ed an eqnilibrium selection theory for N-
person nonc'ooperative I;ames. 'I'hcir rnain subrouline (or ru~lectinR the appropriate
cyuilibrium is thc tracin~ proccdnrc which e.onverts :u~y Rivcn prior into an cyui-
librium. In this paper wc show that the linear tracing procedure is equivaJent, up
Lo projection,to a pivoting procedure presented by the authors. As a consequence
of this equivalence we dc~rive Lhat the linear tracing procedure always Renerates
a perfect equilibrium whenever it is started from a cornpletely mixed prior. Oar
procedure also works in some cascs in which the linear Lracing procedure is not
well-defincd. l~urthermorc, it has Lhc additional advantagc that it is e:u;ily implc-
rnentable on a computer when applicd to bi-matrix ~amex.




The Lracing procedure of llarsanyi and SclLen (198H) is a well-known mel.hocl used for
selecting a Navh eyuilibrium in an N-penon noncooperaLive garne. In (acL, iL is parL of
a more complex equilibriurn selecLion procedure LhaL can be applied to uoncoope~rative
extensivc and norrnal forrn games, as well as Lo coopcrative garnes. Within this proc;e-
dure tlre Lracing proa~dure is used for selecting an ~Ytuilibriurn in certain well-defined
subgames. Thc~e are games with restricted sets of players and sLrategies, that are closed
with respecL Lo besL replics. In the sequel we only consider such well-cJefined garnes in
strategic form.
'1'hc Lracing procedure starts frorn somc cornrnon prior, i.c., Lhc idcav about, Lhc sLraL-
egy used by atry player are Lhe sarnc for all other playcrs. 'I'hcn thc playen raacL opLirnally
Lo thesc expecLations. In gcncral Lhcy obscrvc LhaL Lhcir cxpecLations arc nol. fulfilled
and thus adjusL Lheir expectaLions abouL Lhe bchaviour of thc othcr playcrs. liy simul-
taneously and graclually adjusting the expcY;Lations by Lhe acxtuisition of rnore and rnore
inforrnation, and reacting optimally againsL thewe revised expcx.tations, evenLually an
equilibriurn is rcached.
In van dcn I~;Izcn and '1'alman (1991), a pivoting method for tinding Nayh cyuilibria
in bi-maLrix garncw is proposed. '1'he inLerpreLation o( Lhe process given Lhere is ati
follows. 'I'hc playcrs start from playing a givcn (mixcd) straLcgy. Hy adjusLing Lhcir
strategies and by taking into account the starting st,rategy vector, an atuilibriwn is
reached. More preciscly, the probabilities with which Lhe opt.imal ac:Lions are playcxl arc
increased, whereas all oLher probabilitics are decreaKal. '[hr, starting vevaor kc,r.ps on
playing an itnporLanl, rolc during Lhc wholc~ adjustmcnl, process sincx. adjusLmcnts arc
rnadc rclativc Lo I,hc iniLial sl,ratcgY vccLor. 'I'his mcLhud can c,avily bc implcnrcntcd un
a computer beczuse iL is a cornplemenLary pivoLing algorithm. It can also be geueralized
for games with more Lhan two players. However, we Lhcn have to work with a systern of
nonlinear equal.ions and computaLions becorne cumbersome.
Thus, in boLh procedures Lhe initial st.raLegy vecLor is itnportant during Lhe process.
We will show LhaL, for rnosL priors, Lhc pat.hs gcncraLcxl by both proa~dures arc Lhc
sarne. We do Lhis by revcaling LhaL boLh mcthods arc of Lhe homoLopy t.ypc. 'I'hc
pivoting method can be seen as Lracing a path rclate~el Lo a hornoLopy wiLh rc:rpecL Lo
Lhe strategy scL, i.c., iL gcncraLes a scqucncc of restricLcd Nash cquilibria wherc Lhe
strategies arc restricted to lic in an cxpanding set around the prior. On I,he oLhcr hand,
the tracing proc.edure follows a path uf Nash eyuilibria related Lo a hornotopy with
respect to the payoífs. Initially Lhese payo(fs are only dependent on Lhe prior, whereas
they are gradually converted into the original payoffs of the game. It Lurns out that
there is a I-I rclation bctwcxn Lhc vccLors on both paths.
The tracing procedure has Lwo varianLs; Lhe linear Lracing procedure and Lhe loga-
rithmic Lrac:ing proccxlurc. 'I'hc lal,tcr onc is always wcll-dc(incd and Icads to a unique
equilibriurn. Ilowever, the IogariLhrnic Lracing procedure is difíicult to handle in pracaice.
1'his bec;ause tlre paths involved are nonlinear. (~iven a(ixcxl garne, the linear Lracing
procedure is wcll-dcfincd for almosl, all priors. In thosc cawc~ its pat}c is rY{ual t.o that o(
the IogariLhmic tracing proceduro. I~or a given game, Lhc linear tracing proc:e,~dure is not
well-defined in two ca.gcs. FirsLly, if thc opLimal reply against, Lhc prior is not uniquc,
and sec;ondly for a lowcr-dirncnsional set of priors frorn which thc path gcncratcd reveals
a bifurcaLion. 'I'be proccws of van den l':Izcn and 'I'alman (1991) is not well-de(incd in
a stric:L sub.veL of Lhcsa casc~. Wc will scx, latcr on LhaL onc typc of bifurcation can bc
óandled. In case of Lwo players Lhe proce~ss of van den I;Izen and '1'alman turns ouL Lo
be a complementary pivoting procedure in a sysLem o( linear ex{uat.ions. In t.haL ca4e we
can resolve t,he degeneracy problems by applying lexicographic pivoLing or 131and's rulc
(sec: 131and (1977)). 'I'his would resnlt in an implcmcnt,ablc altcrnal.ivc fur t,hc logarit.mic
tracing proceclurc.
I'rom thc cqUlvalcn(:c of thc linear traciug proccdurc and I,hc pivot.iug mcl,hod wc
derive thaL the linear Lracing procedure generatc~ a perfect equilibriwn whenever thaL
procedurc is well-delinexl and Lhe prior is compleLely rnixed. 'fhus, in such a ca.ve we do
not have to apply the linear Lracing procedure to a sec{uence of perturbe~cl game~, which
is usually needed to obtain perfectness.
'Phe set-up of this paper is as follows. In SecLion 2 wc shortly review Lhe Lraciug
procedure of }íarsanyi and Seltr.n and thc pivoting method of van den Glzen and 'í'alman.
We show Lheir equivalence by inclicating that, generically, boLh rneLhods generate, up
to projcction, Lhc sarnc scc{ucncc of sLrategy vcctors. In Sec,Lion 3 wc show thaL thc
meLhod of van den I~Izen and 'falman can bc used as a practical irnplemcnLal,ion of thc
tracing procedure for bi-matrix garnes. We illusLrate this along wiLh an example given in
Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We also argue that for nondegenerateci bi-mat.rix garnes thc
logarithmic tracing procedure can be mimiced by applying Lhe Lracing procedurc frorn
a suitably perturbed prior. I~ inally, we conclude in Sectiou ~ by considering a bi-rnatrix
garne in which both players have thrce acLions. We analyzc this game with tlre pivoting
procedure. Uirn;t application o[ thc tracing proccdurc from all possiblc priors would
become very rornplicate~cl.
2 Comparison of both procedures
lu Llris sccLion wc sóuw LhaL for a fixccl N-pcrson gacnc, L6c pivoLing mcLóod aud Lhc
lineat Lracing prucedure generically generaLe idenLical paLhs from a qiven prior Lo a Nash
eyuilibrium. More pra:isely, Lhcy coincide if no degr-neracies occur along L6e paL6. llow-
ever, one Lype of elcgeneracy givcs ~w problcm for Lhe pivoLiug proceciure, while Lhe lincar
Lracing procedure bifurcaLe.~. All degeneracies can be solved for Llie Lracing proceclure
by aclding a logariLlunic Lcrm Lo Lhc payolfs.
LeL us slarL wiLh sornc preliminarics. l~or given iulcgcr s~ 0, we dcnoLc by l, L6c scL
{ l, ..., s}. Purlhermore, 12.t sóands for Llie nonnegativc orLlianL of Lhe rn-diureusional
Luclidean spac;e, i.e., li.~ -{x E Rm~x, 1 0, Vr E I,,,}. 13y c(r) we clenole Lhe
r-Lh sLandard uniL vccLor, wl~osc dimc:usion will bc clcar from Lhc conLcxL. Similarly,
we denoLe by 0 aud e a vecLor of zeros and a vecLor of ones of appropriale IengLlr,
respectively. Given Lwo vecLors x and ~ in li,m, we denoLe by [x,~] Llre line scgmeuL
of vecLors beLwecn x and ~, i.c., [:r., J] - {z E Ii.'"~z - ax ~- (I - a)y, 0 G a C I}.
Occasionally, [x, ~] denol.es a curve connec:Ling x ancl ~, raLlir,r Lhan a segmenL. Also Llris
will Ue clear [rom Lhe conóexL. Open and half-open AcgrnOnLB are eknoted by (x,,y) and
(x,~] or [x,~), respect.ivcly, wiLlr obviuus mcaning. I'urLlicrrnore, by xT (~1T) we uican
Lhe Lransposc of a vccl,or x(maórix Il).
LcL Lc given a noucoopcral.ivc N-pcrson gamc in nonnal fonn. Playcr i, i E In~, has
n; pure acf.ions. l'or k E 1,,,, acLion k of player i is denoLnl by (i, k). I~urLlrerrnore,
IeL Lhc scL of aclions of playcr i, i E IN, i.c., {(i,l),...,(e,n;)}, bc clcnoLcJ by ~(i).
'I'hc acLion seL of Llic garnc is clcuolccl by I- U;1(i). 'I'hc Lolal nun~bcr of acLions is
denoLed by n, i.c., n-~N r n;. 'l'I~us, Lhe tnixecl s1,raLegY space of playcr i equals Lhc
(n; - 1)-ditncnsional seL S"'-~ :- {q; E K~'~ ~k-~ 7~k - I}. 'I'hc sóraLcgy spacc oC Llic
game is Lhen S- IIN~Sn'-r with generic elemenL sLraLegy vecóor q -(y~ ,...,qN)T
't'lie k-Lli pure stralegy of playcr i is cleuoLed by e;k. Soinetiinec, a sLraLcgy veclor q is
denoted as (q;,q-;), wóere q-; iudicaL~ LIraL playcr j~ í plays slraLegY Ri. SirnilarlY,
(4~,P-~) ~crwles LhaL playcr j ~ i plays pi. If playcr J, J E ~N, Plays pure sóraLegy ki
Lhen playcr i obLains a payoff ll;(c~k,,...,r,NkN). I~rom Llicsc pure s1.raLcgY payoffs wc
obLain fur cach playcr i Llic payoff fuucLion ll; : S-~ I1 dcliuccl by
~~;(9) - ~ IIjElNR74~IIi(~I,...,~N),
0E0
wlrcre ~ is Llre seL of pure sLraLcgy vcx:Lors. "L'Ims, Ll~c payo(f rclaócd Lo a uiixcd sóralegy
ve:cóor q is a wcigl~Lcd avcragc of Lhc rclcvanL pure sLralcgy payoffs. 'l'hagc wcighLs alual
the expected probabilities with which the respective pure strategy vectors occur.
In thc saiucl wc dcnotc a noncoopcrativc garnc in normal form I' as a tuple
(N,n,(ll;)NI), wil.h n- (n1i...,nN). Now, a stratcgy vcctor q' E S constitutes a
Nash eyuilibriurn of 1' - ~N,n,(ll;)N ~~ if
H;(y') ? ll;(y;,9-;), dqt E S"'-' and `di E IN.
Furthcrrnorc, wc dc(iuc the margiual payoff function of playcr i, H; : S--~ R"', by
II;(y) - (ll:(~;~, y-;), . - - , lfi(~;,,,, q-:))T .
Thus ll;k(y), k E 1,,,, denotcs thc payo(f Lo playcr i if hc plays action k whcert`as playcr
J ~ i plays q~. Of coursc, Vi E IN and tlq E .S it holcls Lhat ll;(y) - qT !1;(q). 11, is
well-known that q` E S is a Nash eyuilibrium if and only if
riik - f) 11 IÍikly') ~ InC X ll;r(y'),
d(t, k) E l. (l.l)
We are now rcady to Cormulate the pivoting proccss ax given in van dcn I:Izen ancl
Talrnan (1991) for a bi-Inatrix garnc. 1}crc wc givc a atraightforward gcncralizal,iun for
an N-playcr galnc. Sl.arting frorn a given prior p E S t.ha proccdurc gcncraLcw a picccwisc
smooth path of strategy vcct.ors q in .S sat,isfying for all (i, k) E l,
ytk - b(y, p)Pik if H;k(y) G rnax~ fl;r(q)
y;k 1 6(rh P)Pik If ll;k(r~) - maXr lli[(y),
where 0 G b(q,p) :- rnint;,iV{~~P;r ~ 0} G I.
Observe LhaL q - p satisfies ('l.a) with b(p,p) - I. Also cach Nash c~uilibrium
q' E S satisfiu~ (`l.3) with b(y', p) - 0 or with p;k - 0 for all (i, k) for which H;k(y') G
max~ H;c(q'). Along thc paLh thc pararnetcr 6(q, p) initiaily dccrcases from L Lct us
define for prior p and b E[0, L], the sCL Sy(b) -{y E S~y ~ 6p}. Note t.hat S,(1) -{p}
and .Sn(0) - S. '}'hen we derive frorn (`l.l ), (`l.'l) and ('L.3) Lhat the pivot.ing procexiure
generates írom p a path of restricted Nash cquilibria, i.c., Nash cquilibria with strategies
s
restricted to thc set S~(h) with G going frorn I cithcr to zcro or to some 6 1 0. 'fhe vectors
generated by the pivoting procedurc are Nash equilibria in thc sense that nonoptimal
actions are played wiLh thi, nrinirnany allowed probability. In case the procedure stops
at 6~ 0, tlrc point q' rclated to Sp(b) is such that p;k - 0[or all ( i, k) for which
H;k(q') G maxr II;c(q'), and thus q' is a Nash c~c{uilibrinrn o[ Lhe game.
For latcr rcfcrcncc wc rcwritc ('l.a) as follows. hirsLly, wc definc Vi E IN and t1q E.S,
the set "l;(q) collecting the optimal acLions of player i aL strategy vector q, i.e., T;(q) -
{(i,k) E I(i)~Il;k(q) - maxcll;~(y)}. We then derive thaL the set of strategy vectors
satisfying ( `l.3) equals thc seL oí strategy vectors q E ,5' satisfying Hi E Ix,
9i - h(9, P)Pi f ~ ~ikeÍk), ('l.4)
(i,k)ET.(4)
where a;k i n and ~(;~k)ET.(4) ~ik - I- b(~~,P)~
The procedure of van den I~,Izcu and 7'BIrII'dll (1991) is wcll-dclined for alnrosL all pri-
ors, given an arbitrary garne. Lr Lhose cases systcrn ('l.:{) dcterrniucs a picY',ewisc smooth
paLh connceting Lhc prior and a Neuvh cyuilibriuur. 'I'his path is picccwisc lincar in easc
of Lwo playcrs. Problcins might, arisc whcn dcgcncracics occur, i.c., whcn along thc path
traced by the procedure more than one ineyuality in ('l.a) becorne~ an cx{uality sirnulta-
neously. lu case of two players these problems can be resolved by standard Lc.r.hniques
used in lincar prograrntning.
Next, we arrive aL Lhc lincar tracing procedure, which also starts wit,h a prior p. llcrc
p; is intcrprcLcd as Lhc cxpcc:Lations of playcrs j~ i about t.hc straLcgy playcd by à. 'I'hc
linear tracing proccdurc gencratcs a path of Nash eyuilibria for gamcs I'~ from l- 0 to
t- í. Ilere I'r denotc~ the original gatne I' - ~N,n,(Il;);~r). The payoff function of
player i in garnc I"r, 0 G t G 1, is given by H; : S~ N., with
II;(9;P) - tN;(9) f (1 - t)fI;(9i,P-i). ('2.5)
AL t- 0 each player i plays optimally against p-;. hor Lhe línear tracing procedure to
be well-deíined this optimal reply has to bc uniyuc. 'I'liis generically holds. It follows
directly from (`l.5) that. if qc is a Nash cyuilibriurn poinL of I'p, thcn for cac:ó i E IN, q;
has Lo be a bcwL reply against the rnixed strategy tq' ; f(1 -l)p-;. 'l'he linear I,racing pro-
cedure is well-defined in almost all cases in which the pivoting procedtrre is well-defined.
7
We return to Lhis poinL in the next theorcrn.
Summarizing thc forcgoing WL' C8O say thaL thc pivoting procc;dure gcneratcs a path
B(I', p) of vectors in Li( I', p), where
~(I~,p) - Iq E .SIq E Nlsso(6)(1 ) , b E[~, 1]},
with NGSy(6)(I') the, seL of Nash equilibria of I' with rcwtricted strategy se;t SP(b). More
precisely, the path connects S~(1) -{p} and a Nash equilibriurn of the original game.
On the other hand, the linear tracing procedure generates a path of vectors G(I',p)
in G(I',p), whcre
C(1',p) -{(q`,t) E S x [0, l]~qc E NLs(I'p)},
with NF,'(I'P) thc sct of Nash cxtuilibria of I'p. '1'hc pal.h cunnccts S x{0} and S x{ I}.
The rclation bctwe.r.n thc two expressions is rcvcaled by thr. next thc;orcnr.
Theorem 2.1. Lr.t be given an N-person nonc:oopcrativc garnc I' and a prior p E S. If
the tinear traciug procedure is well-defined, Lhen t.he paths o( the pivoting proceciurc and
the linear tracing procedure coincide up to projection. More precisely, a Na.tih c~cauilibrium
of I'p, 0 G t G l, gencrated by t.hc linear tracing procc,dure, is in I-t e:orrespondena;
with a rrstricted Nash cyuilibricnn on Sp(I - l) gcncratcd by Lhc pivoting procedurc.
Furtherrnore, onc source for bifure:ation of Lhe linear Lracing procedure is rernovc.d by
the pivoting procedure.
Proof. 'I'he lincar tracing procedure generates dt E[0, 1], vectors q` E NE(I'p). '1'he
latter implies that tli E!N, q,~ is optimal against tq~ ;~(1 - t)p-;, i.e., (1 - t)p -F tq` E
NF,sp(,-t)(['). ~I'hc lat.tcr vcct.or satis(ies (2A) with 6(q,p) - I- l.
On thc othcr hand, thc pivoting proccdurc gcncratcs vcc-.tors q E NI;,ti„(c,)(I') with
6 E[0, 1], i.r,., q; - bp; f~'r,(v) a;kc(k), with ~.r.dv) a;t -)- b, Và E IN. '1'hercforc,
9- bp f(1 - 6)4, with q; - r~6~~:(v) a;kc(k), tli E IN, if 6~ I. "Chus, q E NE([~p-6).
In case b- I, q; - c(k;), t!i E!N, with k; thc optimal action o( playcr i against p.
Clearly, thc relat,ions abovc describe a homeomorphisrn between Nash eyuilibria of I'y
and restrictcd Nash cquilibria of f' on Sp(1 - t).
Finally, ohnc,rvc t,hat. Lhe lincar tracíng proa~durc I,raccs a path frorn l. - 0 to t- l.
This airresponds t.o Lhc variablc h(q,p) in thc pivoting procedurc going frorn 1 to 0.
k
flowever, the latter procedure rnay stop at a q' at which h(cj ,p) ~ 0. 'I'his happens if
p;k - 0, t1(i, k) ~ U~1~(q'). lu thaL case the tracing procA~dure may bifure-atc. If not, the
path L(I',p) becomes nonlinear bec;ause qc is nonlinear in L for l~ 1- h(q',p). O
In case the linear tracing procc,dure bifurcates, Ilarsanyi and Selten propose Lo replace
that method by tlre logarithrnic Lr:u:ing proc;rdure. In Lhc latter procedure Lhe payoffs
are augmentcd witlr a logarithmic term. Morc preciscly, `dl E ( 0, 1), we define Lhe garnc
Í'~ with payoff function ll; : S H R, di E hr, given by
if:(q;p,il) -1i~;(q) f( I -1)f~,(q;,l~-.) t v(I -1)n; ~ h,gq,k, (z.c)
k-1
where, p is a very stnall positive number and cr; a garne-dependenL positive constanL. IL
can be shown that for any game I', any prior p ancl any srnall positive number p Lhere
exists a uniquc pat.h of Nash cyuilibria y(1, p, p) in I'~ with t going frorn 0 Lo I. hcL us
denote the end poiut hY q(1, p, rl). 'l'hcn thc liroit of q( I, p, rl) with rl going I,o zcro, cxists
and is the equilibriurrt selected by the logarithmic tracing proccdure. hurthermore, it
eyuals the equilibrium selected by the linear tracing proccYfure in case the latter proce-
dure is well-defined. hor thc proo( of all of this we refer to Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
and Schanucl cL aL (1991). Wc stress that in case the pivol,ing procedure is well-defined
while the lincar traciug procedure bifurcatc:s, the eyuilibrium selected by our proccdure
may differ from the one obtaine.d by the logarithmic Lracing procedura '1'his will be
illustrated in Lhc nexL section.
Oue of Lhe goals of the Ilarsanyi-Selten selection rnethod is Lo Gnd a perfect Nash
equilibrium. '[hat is why they apply the rnethod to a sc~etuenc:e. of truncated garnes, i.e.,
games in which actions are always played with positive probability. 'I'hen by Ietting
the disturbanccw go to zero, Lhe corre~ponding scyuence of Nash equilibria gives a per-
fe.ct Nash equilibrium. All t.lris would noL be neccssary in csse the logarit.hmic tracing
procedure would always give a perfect N.LVh eyuilibrium, which is noL the c.ase ( see van
Damme ( 198:f, p. 85)). However, thc pivoting procedure always yields a perfcct ectuilib-
rium whenever óhc prior is cornpletely mixcd. fn van dcn lslicn and 'Palman ( 1991) this
is proved for bi-matrix games. But thc proof is in fact also valid for any finite number of
players. I'rom Theorem 2.l wc obtain that Lhis resuló also applies to thc lincar trac:ing
procedure. This rcwult is the rnorc, relevanl, when we consider Lhe tracing procedure of
Harsanyi and Selten ( 1988) in the light of their complete selcction theory. One part of
that theory is devoted to thc choicc of thc prior. 'I'his prior will always bc cornplctcly
mixed. 'I'his is cíue to the fact that we are dcdliug with (sub)gamcs in which there are
no dorninated actions. 'I'hus, initially thcrc will bc paL sorne weight on any ac:Lion.
hor games with more than two players all methods are c:omputationally cumbersome.
This because all eyuations bcc;ome nonlinear. ílowever, in van den l;lzen and 'Calman
(1994) a rnethod is described Lhat makes use of linearizations. That method can be used
for approximating a Nssh cquilibrium of a nonc:oopcrative N-pcrson garnc. l(owever,
the appealing iutcrpretation is lost.
3 Application to bi-matrix games
For bi-rnatrix garnes Lhc rnarginal payoff functions of the; players are linc.ar. We will
show that in this case the procedure of van den Lau;n and 'f'alrnan (1991) boils down
to a complernentary pivoting proce.dure. in a systcrn of linear equations. 'I'his proa;dure
can easily be iinplernented on a computer. We already argued in Lhe I,revious se;c:Lion
thaL Lhe proccdum gcncric.ally coincidcs, up Lo projcxa,ion, with thc linc:~r Lrac~iug pro-
cedure. In that. reapecl, our inethocl can also be viawed er,ti a ex,rnputat.ioually aLLractiva
method for implernenting Lhe linear tracing procedure for bi-matrix ganies. Ilowevr.r, in
Section 2 we indicated one irnportant differena; bet.wec;n the pivoting method and the
linear tracing proccYlure. The latter method always i.rac;es a path frorn l- 0 Lo !. - I.
The pivoting method may stop earlicr. 'Ihis happens if at an intermediatc stagc a Nash
equilibriurn for Lhe origirral garne has bec;n reachr.d. 'I'he path generated by the linear
tracing procedurc (rom thc vector mlatcd to Lhat Nash cYtuilibrium onwards, bifurcatcs
in case of rnore eyuilibria. In addition, it always be.~corues nonlinear and is therefore hard
to Follow cornputationally. Of course, also Lhe logarithrnic tracing procedure provides a
solution in these cases. (iut t.hat met.hod seemy to be of no practical use in computation.
This because we have t.o follow nonlinear paths.
A bi-niatrix garnc I' is a t.uple (ni, nZ, U, V) with re; t.hc nurnbcr o( actions of playcr i,
i- 1,2, whercas U(V ) denot.es the payoff matrix of playcr 1(`l). Morc preciscly, U and
V are of diinensiou n~ x nz where an clernent u~k of U(v~k of V) indicaLc;s the payoff to
player I('l) i( player l plays action j E 1,,, and player 2 plays actiou k E 1,,,. hor Lhe
marginal payoff funct,ion II : S-, l2."'}"' wc obtain
H(q) - (~~i ( q), ~~s( q))T , with ÍIr(q) - Uqs and !!z(q) - VT9r. (3.1)
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Now, consider ( `l.3) and obscrve Lhat for each q in .S generated by the pivoting method
starting from prior p E S, thcre is aL IeaSt one scL T C I satisfying
qik ? hÍ~ik and llik(ri) - ~~i, (2, k) E!
qik - óp;k and Flik(q) C iji, (2, k) ~ I,
with 1; :- T fl I( i) ~ H, i- I, 2. In Lhe abovc h is a variable substituting b(q, p), whereas
Qr - maxk Ukqz and ~i - rnaxk qi Vk with Ck (Ck) dcnoting Lhe k-th row ( colurnu) of a
matrix C.
Observe frorn (:3.1) that Flrk(q) - flkqz anci Hzk(q) - q~ l~k. Next, we substitute (3.1)
into (3.2), add slacks p;k 1 0 for Lhe incx)ualities Il;k(q) C Q;, ( i, k) ~ 7', and slacks
~;k ~ 0 for the ineyualities q;k ~ 6p;k, ( i, k) E'1'. Wc obtain that each q on the path
satisfics `di E !z
qi - hPi -3- ~ ~,kc(k) with ~ aik - I - G, (3.3)
(i~k)E"l~ (~.k)E~~:
while
U9z ~ L~(I.k)Q'1'{klk~(k) - cijr
UT4r f ~(z.k)g'r izzkr'(k) - e~l-









} ~(2,k)ET ~Zk I f ~(~,k)~,~ ~Ik
)
where 0 G h G 1, a;k ~ 0, tI(i, k) E 7', and ~r;k 7 0, V(i, k) ~'I'. Obscrvc that
system (3.5) contains nr ~ nz -} 2 eyuations with ni ~- nz f 3 variables, thus lcaving
one degree of íreedom. Clcarly, any strategy vcctor q satisfying (2.3) tits into (3.5) for





path of strategy vect.ors by perforrning a se~ctuence of linear prograrnming pivoting steps
in systcrn (3.5). l)nder the standard nondegeneracy assurnption it always converges to a
Nastt eyuilibriwn. Othcrwise, we can resolve degeneracy problems by applying standard
techniqucs.
Let us quickly recall the working of this method. At the start we have L- l, T- 0,
~r - Uk'Pz - maxk Ukp~i, (iz - Pi Vk, - rnaxk Pi Vw;, Illk - I'1 - UkP2 for k~ kl aud
Irsk - Íjs - Pi Vk for k~ kz. M'rorn (:{.:3) we deduce Lhat indced q- P. 'I'he procedurc
then leavcs p by doc;matiing b frorn t and thcreforc incrcasing alk, and alkz. If in systern
(3.5) thr, variable b bcxomes zero then the procedure has found a Nash eyuilibriurn (see
discussion bclow ('l.3)). 1''.lse, if in (3.5) a(~-variable becornes zero - say (i;~, - thcn eithcr
p~k - 0 for all (j, k) with p~k ~ 0 and a Nawh cquilibrium has bcxn found (ac.r. bclow
(2.3)) or in thc next itcration a;h is incre:L9ed frorn u~ro. Convcrscly, thc variablc ~~;k is
increascd frorn zcro in thc ncxt itcration if a;k bccomcs zcro.
Wc can givc somc galnc-Lhc~crrctic intcrprctation for Lhc proccdurc. hruln (:3.`l) wc scx-
that T constitutcs thc set of actions giving maxirnal marginal payolf to a playcr. I''or
convenience we call thcxe actions optirnal. At the st.art eacó player has a uniyuc olrl,imal
action in case t.he problern is nondegenerated. hrom the starL the related probabilities
are increased (aik, and ~2A, are raised from zcro), whcrcas thc probabilitics relatcd to
the othcr actions arc dccrca~ccd ralatively cxtually (dccrcasc in b). If an actiou (7, la) bc-
comes optimal ((r~r, bex;omes zc~ro) then a Nash ex{uilibrium rnay be reached. Othcrwise,
it is kcpL opt.irnal and the related probability is rclativcly incrcased (a~i, is raised frorn
zero). On t.he other hand, if the probabilit.y with which an optimal action (i, k) is played
becornes relativcly nliuimal (a;k becorras zero) t,heu i1, is kept so aud the related ac.tion
is made nonoptirnal (~a;k is increased frorn zero).
Let us now review both proc:edures along wit.h the example given by Ilarsanyi and
Selten ( 1988). 'Chey consider the bi-matrix game 1' -(n1in2,U,V) with nl - n2 - 2
and
(~- f'L U J audV-(
I lll.
L O 1 L O ~1 J
It is easily chec;ked that this game has two purc Nash cyuilibria, ~I -((I,0)T,(1,0)T)
and C-((0,1)T,(0, l)T), and onc rnixal C(tI11lIbCILLIr1, Q-((5, 5)T,( s, 4)T). In Figure
3.1 we repn~se~nt all relevant inforrnation in the st.rategy space. 'I'he pure strategy vectors
((0,1)T,(1,0)T) and (( I,0)T,(0,1)T) arc dcnotcd by B and U, respec;l.ivcly. 'Chc index
(kr,k2) denotcw: thaL in the relatexi subset, of ,S action kl is optinral for player L and
I `l
acóion kl for playcr'l. I~'or cxainplc, (1,2) holds aL sLraócgy vccLors in Lhc convcx hull of
{R, h;Cl,.l}. Similarly, wc obLain LhaL on (.l,(l~ acl,ion 'l is oplirnal for playcr'2 whercas
player 1 is indiffercuL bclwcxn his ac;Lions. Ilarsanyi 1nd SclLen (1!)88) cousider Lhra~
di(fercnL priors, P- (( ji j)Ti(6~ 6)T)~ i~~ -((q~ ~)T~( j~ j)T), and 1~~ - (( S~ 5)T~l ji j)T)-
7'hese vccLors are also indicaLed in Lhe l~igure 3.1. hur6hennore, we depicL Lhe seL Sp~(,~-t ).






Figure 3.1. 'Che sLraLcgy spacc S o( Lhc game wióh Lhe Lhree cyuilibria i1, C, and Q.
[n Lhe I'igures 3.2.a and 3.2.b Lhe case wiLó prior eyual Lo p is LreaLai. Figurc ;i.'l.a deals
wióh Lhe procedure of van den rlu.n and 'I'almau (1991). 'I'he seL of sLraLegy vecLors
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Figure 3.2.a. 'I'hc rc.wtrictcd Na.ah aiuilibria of i' rclated to the sets SP(G), b E [0, 1],
consist Of tI1C 9CP.,IrICntB (p,C], [~l, A'], and [il',Q].
One patL connects the prior p aud C, the second piecewise lincar path connects ~l and Q.
IL is easily vcrified tha4 the vectors on thesc paths indced satisfy (3.'2). For exatnple, on
[i1',Q] theseL T eyuals {(1, 1),(`L, 1),('l,2)}. Of course, the procc~cluregeueratc~s the paLli
from y to tlre sclected cyuiJibrium C. l~'igurc 3.`l.b is takcu from Ilarsauyi and Sr,ILen
(1988) and revcals the set of Nash cyuilibria o[ Pp, t E[0, 1], in S x(0, 1], containing
Lhe path traccd by the liuear traciug proe;cdure. '1'he latter path connects C x{0} anJ
C x{ I}. '1'hc othcr part COCCC3pOr1(~3 to Nasó cyuilibria fur 1'~, t~~U. Notc that thc
curvc conncctiug R and Q is noulincar.
Ii.errtark LhaL our proccduro has also advantagcs conccrniug its graphical rc~rrescuta-
tion. For thc [nethod of Ilarsanyi and Sclten we nced onc extra ditncnsiou to rcprescut
l. In our rne6hocl Lhaó variable is rellecled in lhe expancling set arowrd Lhc prior.
ct i
~'~ ~I~ 1 ~~~ ~ ~ ~
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I~igure 3.2.b. 'I'hc scl of Nasl~ cquilibria uf 1'p, l E (o, 1], depict.cd in S x(0, I].
As sLipulaLecl iu Scc6ion `l every q un óhe paóhs in I~igruc ;S.'l.a can Lc secu as a rc-
stricted Nash eyuilibriurn point of Sy(1 - l~, for some l E (o, 1]. The sLraóegy vectors
ou Lhe piecewise linear haLlr counccLiug Q ancl Il are reslricLeJ equilibria on S~(1 - t),
l~ o, and correspoud 6o Nasli cquilibria of 1'p, t~ i~, as dcpicócd iu I~igurc 3.2.6.
Observe Lliat, in our sel up óhe lal.ócr pallr is rnuch cavier 6u órace Llran 1.6c rclalal paLh
of ólrc lincar lraciug proccdure, whcrc nonlincaritics in l originatiug from cxpressing Q
as an cctuilibrium of L'p, l~ r~, am involvecl.
Sitnilarly, we can aualyze Llre ca.ge in whicli LI~e priur equals li . '1'he correspondiug
graphical represenLaLiuns for Lhe pivoLing procedure ancl 61~e linear óraciug procedure
arc givcn in 1~ igures 3.:9.a and '5.3.6, respccLivcly. Now, llrc picccwisc lincar curve wiLh
segmenós [li , U'], (U', C'], and [C', C] in l~ igure 3.3.a corragponds Lo t,hc ~riixcwise linear
curvc conncca.iut; U, I)', C', and C"' in 1''igurc 3.:1.6. Sirnilarly, L6c piccewisc liucar curvc
with scgrnenLs [il,~l'] aud [A',(~] in I~igurc ; {.:La rclxLcs Lo LI~c curvc cousisóing uf lhc
segmenLs [Q, ~l], [IZ, ~l"], and [~I", ~l"'] in 1~ igure S.;Lb.
, ~ ,' ~ ~' i
D'
1
Figure 3.3.a. '1'lie seó of resl.ricócd Nash cyuilibria of I' on ,SP.(G) for G E[0, I]. 7'6c
piecewise linear paLh couuecling p', U', C', and C is Lraced by LLe pivoóing proce,.dure.
~~ rc-----
! ~ .- ,
~ L-' ~-~,~~ , '~
n ~'------~-~~~r,
r~-3is
Figure 3.3.6. 'L'he seó of Nasó cquilibria of I'~ for l E [0, l] represeuted in S x[0, I].
Tl~e paóh connecóing U, U', C', and C"' is followed by lbe linear trac:ing proceclure.
3 c;
Let us fiually move to the case with prior p". '3~Le seL of strategy vectors satisfying the
conditious of tóe pivoting procedure are depicted iu I~ igure 3A.a. '1'his procedure yields
wittriu onc itcratiou tóc nrixed Naslr cyuilibrium (l. 7'Ira4 thc sct of vcx;ton satisfyiug
(`L.3) bifurcates at Q is not relevaut for this method bn:ause tlre procedure stops at Q with
6(Cl,P") - i~ 0. Snch a G corresponds to t-~ in the lincar tracing procedure. HuL [or
t- z Lhat proccclurc gcncratcs two segmcnl,s of Nash cquilibria corresponding Lo [A',Cl]
aud [Q, G'] aud it Lherefore bifurcates. 'Chis is clepicted for Llre lurear traciug proe:eeJure
in l''igurc 3.4.6 witlr two r.urvcs, ouc connccting U', C', and C", thc other counccting Cl,





P'igure 3.4.a. '[ Ire sct of rc~strictcd Naslr c~cluilibria u[ I' ou SP~~(z) consisls of thc scg-
rnents [il', Q] ancl [C~, C'].
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Figure 3.4.b. '1'lle seL G([, p") rcvcaling a Li[urcaLion aL l- 2.
'1'o rtwolvc Llw bifurcaLiou problcm Ilarsauyi and SdLcn (1988) devclupcd Lhc loga-
ritlunic Lracing proaxlure whicll is well-defined for any galue an(I any prior, i.e., iL always
selecLs a uniyue eyuilibriurn. llowcver, LhaL Inethod is noL very Lracl.ablc. We argue LhaL
for generic bi-rnatrix games, a specific per4urba6ion of Lhe prior could also do Lhe job.
More precisely, if in case o( bifurcation Llte linear Lracing procedure would be reslarLed
frorn a spccilically pcrLarbed prior, II. scl(Y:LY Lllc satnc (~yuilibrimn as L6c IogariLhmic
Lrac:ing proccdure sLar6iug frum Lhc original prior. Of c~.oursc, onc can also :rpply ow~
melhod dira:Lly using sLandard Lcchniqucs Lo avoid dcgcncracy, buL Lllis Inay Icad Lo
anolhcr Nash c.quilibrium.
Consider expression (2.G) coucerning tlce IogariLlunic payoffs. 1'rom Lhe appearancc
of the logaril.htnic Lerm iL is r,lear LIIaL Lhe relaled Nasll equilibria for l c 1 are com-
plelely tnixed. Compared Lo f.he Navll equilibria rolaLed Lo Lhe payoff strucLure in (2.5),
Lhc IaLLcr cyuilibria arc pcrLlu~Led Lo Lhc ccnóro of Lhc sLra6cgy spacc. lu Lcruts of rc-
sóricled Nash eyuilihria, eaclr eyuilibrium gencraócd from ('l.G) for given p aud p again
la
correspo~uls to a restrictcd Nash cyuilibrium for that payoff structurc on Sp(1 - t). In
comparison Lo Lhc pivoting procedure also that vc~ca.or is slightly perturbed towards the
cc:ntrc of ,Sp( I- t). In thc sc~clucl wc unly cunsidcr st.andard uundcgcncratcd bi-matrix
games with a finite nurnber of isolatcd cyuilibria. 'I'he~x~ garnes constitutc a dcuse subset
of the set of bi-rnatrix games. Concerning these gamc~r it holds that there cxists a finite
set of (relatively) open subsets in Ghc stratr,gy set, such Lhat starting the lincar tracing
procc~dure frorn any prior within a certain subset Ieads Lo one specific se.lected Nash
eyuilibriurn. 'I'he closures of thesc open sets of attracLion covcr Lhe stratcgy seL. Degcn-
eracics occur at iutcracv:Lions of thcwc closun~c. All tlris is dcrivcxl frorn t,hc c,yuivalancx,
of Lhc lincar Lracing proccdure and Lhc pivoting procc:durc in casc thc linl. pruavlwc
is wcll-dc(ined. licxause in case of bi-matrix garncs thc pivoting procc~durc opcratcs in
a lincar sysl,ern thc obscrvations givcn abovc follow frocn atandard lincar progranrming
theory. In the thcurem below we state that if we apply t,he logarithrnic trac:ing procedure.
from a degenerated prior whereas Lhe path of restricted Nash cyuilibria related Lo (`l.G)
for small rt enters a specilic at.Lraction seL, we could alternatively apply the linear Lracing
procedure frcmr a prior within Lhat. set.
Theorem 3.1. Let bc givcn a nondegcncratcd bi-rnatrix game f' and prior p, and Ict
the lincar tracing proa~dure be not wcll-de(incd for (I',p). for given t and rl, Ict q(t,p,rt)
be the restricted Na.tih equilibrirmr on Sr,( l - l) related Lo I,he logarithmic I,r:u:iug pruce-
dure. Furthermore, aRSUrue the existence of some srnall ! and sorne small q suc,h that all
q(t,p,rl), O G t G t and 0 G rl G ïl lie in one attraction seL. 'Chen the logarithmic Lracing
proc.c,dure wif.h prior p sclecas Lhe same Nash equilibriurn as Lhe linear tracing procedure
with a prior within that, attraction seL.
Proof. 1'or any srnall rt 1 0 thcrc exists a curvc q(t,p,p) of restricted Na,gh cquilibria
on .Sp( l- t) relat,ed Lo Nash equilibria for payoffs ll; (q; p, rt), i E h, with t E [(1, 1].
Now, fix a srnall l. E(U, t] and rl E ( 0, rl] and consiclcr Lhc vcctor it(l, p, rl). I~or l, rt
small cnough iL holds that q(l,P,rl) - lirnc-,r 9(t,P,p) - limc-.r 9(t,7(t,P,rt),rl). 'fhus,
for srnall rj thc path from p has Lhc samc lirnit as thc path starting from q(t, p, rj), i.c., a
vector early on thc former path. '1'his is due to the faca thal. ,Sa( I - t) ~ Sqtr.P,,,~(1 - t)
and ll~(4;4(t,Rrl),rl) - H;(4;P,rl)f(1-l)(ll;(4;4(t,P,q)) - fl;(4;P)). 'l'hc influcnceof
the lattcr tenn disappcars if t-~ 1. Observe that this rewriting is only possible because
for bi-matrix garnes, fl; is linear in 4;.
liepeating this for il j 0 we obtain that q(1, p) - lim~lo q(1, p, il) -
lim~to q(1, q(t, p, il), il). Here q(I, p) is the equilibrium selected by the logarithmic tracing
Is
procedure írorn p. 13ecause (or small enough t and p, all q(t, p, p) lie in the same attrac-
tion set, lim„lu q(l,q(t,P,q),q) - lnnnlo9(1, 9(t,P,n),r1), for small enough t and i(. O
We illustrate this for the case sketched in I'igure 3.4.a. Applying the linear tracing
procedure from p" gives a projected movernenL towards D, i.e., for player 1 action 1 is
optirnal, and for player `L action `l. Ilowever, the logarithrnic tracing ptoccxíure givc~ an
optimal strategy vcxtor cyual Lo D,,, bciug complctcly mixcd and lying on thc diagonal
of S, connecting !3 and U. 'Chus, initially the logarithmic tracing procecíure movc.w -
when projected - towards D,,,. I3ut then iL e,nLers the attraction set related I,o C aud
it selecLs C. Note that the attractiort seL for the logarithmic Lrac.ing proa:durc related
to G cousisLs of all strategy vcctors bclow and on {[W',(~],[Q,W]}. I~i)r thc lincar
tracing procalurc wc obtain Lhc samc seL cxcxpt [W',Q] and [Q,W]. 'I'hus, if wc rnovc
p" sornewhat into the direction of D,,, and apply the linear traciug procedure then we
select the sarne equilibrium. If we clirectly apply the pivoLing procedure atarting froni a
prior on ([W',C~], [(l, W]} always Cl is selecLed. Ilenex~, for Lhow~ priors, the cYtuilibriinn
selected by the pivoting procedure di(fers írom Lhat selected by Lhe logarithrnic Lracing
proccdu re.
Finally wc rcrnark LhaL 'I'hn)rcm a.l will noL always bc applicablc. If t.hc payo(f
structurc of Lhc gamc is such Lhat in higurc 3.9.a. Lhc pi(x:ewisc liucar cnrvc consisLing
of the segmenLs [W', Cl] ancí [Q, W] coincides with Lhe diagonal [!3, U] Lhen no aLLraction
set will be entered. 'I'he paLhs related to Lhe logarithmic tracing procedurc rernain on
Lhc diagonal and the ntixcd eyuilibriurn C~ will be selccLed. 'L'his casc is considered by
Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Scction 4.14).
4 An example
'hhc rnain irnportanrc o( uur cousl.rnct.ivc approach is t,h:ct iL cnablcs Ils LO Ilsc Lhc Lracing
proccdure in pracLicc bcyond ('l x'l) bi-maLrix garnc~s. Wc illusLratc Ll)is by analyzing
the bi-matrix game introduced by Young (1993), in which each player has three actions.
The payoff matrices are given by
6 5 0 6 0 0
(~ - p 7 5 and V- 5 7 5
0 5 8 0 5 8
This game has Lhrc:e pure Nash r~uilibria, (( I,0,0)T,(1,0,0)T), (( 0,1,0)T,(0,1,0)T),
`l0
and ((O,O,I)T,(0,0,1)T). 'L'lie oLhcr lwo cx~uiliLria arc ((p,8,0)T,(R,Á,O)T) aud
((0,5,')T,(~~5~s)T)-
Figure 4.1.a. '1'he sLralegy space of playcr l.
Figure 4.1.b. 'Cl~c sLrategy space of playcr 2.
ln 61~e t''igures 4.1.a and 4.1.b llw slraLegy s}ilccs of playcrs 1 aud `l, respecLivcly, arc
depicóed. Tlie indices (i, k) cleno6e opLiiual reply act,ions for player i. For exauiple, ólie
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index ('l, 3) in 1~igure 4. La indicaLcs LhaL action 3 is Lhc bcsl. rcply of playr.r'l againsL auy
sóraócgY in Lhc convcx hull of C, C~, an(1 ll playcd by playcr I. Simil:u'IY, (I, I) in I~igurc
4.1.b denolcs Lhat acLion 1 is op6ilnal for playcr 1 againsL any slralr.gy of playcr `l in Lhe
convex hull of ~l, Ir, an(I I). 'I'hc mixal afuilibria arc in(lical.ccl by (U,l)) and (ll,ll).
I~urLhennore, Sp(0.5) cquals Sp(O..i) x SP(O.~i), wilh thc IaLLer subscós as indicaóed itt Lltc
f igu r(~.
LcL us uow considcr Ilow Lhc lincar Lrac:ing proccvlurc operaLcs on Lhis galnc. Wc
do Lhis by applyiug Lhc pivoóing Incl.ho(l. I~ix sotnc priors P- (pr,Pi)~ Lhc analysis
gocs vcry ca5y. I~or ax:unplc, if pl lios in Lhc ama corresponlling Lo (`l,S) ancl ln in Lhc
region rclaLed Lu (l,:f), Lllcu Lllc N.ISb equilihrium (G,C) is rcac:hcxl in unc sLcp. Sinr
ilarly, wc obt.aiu LhaL (II,LJ) is rcachccl in onc sócp frorn a prior p wiLh pr rclaLcd Lo
(2,2) and Pz relaled Lo (1,`l). Finally, wióh pr correspondiug Lo (2,1) aud pz Lo (1,1),
Llle equilibriurn (~l, ~l) is obLaincd. ~I'o geL furLhcr insighL we consider Lwo more priors,
p-((!, Á, Á)T, (K, q, A)T) aO(1 p-(( ~, 8, Á)T, (0, ~, Z)T). I30LI1 1)r10B arc iudicalcd 111
Lhe Figures h.'l.a and 4.'l.b.
rigurc 4.2.a. 'I'hc slra4cgy spacc of playcr I.
Figure 4.2.b. '1'hc sLraLegy space of playcr 'l.
Given prior ji il is opLiinal for playcr `l Lo play (`L,'l) and for playcr 1 lo play ( l,3). '1'Lus,
iu the pivoLing proccdure Lhe rclaóccl probabililics arc incrcasecl. Aloug Lhe sLralcgy paLlt
frorn p 6he compoucul rclaLccJ I,o playcr 1 movcs Luwards C and LIraL of playcr 'l Lowards
B. At l - ~~ Lhe sLralegy of player l equals ólre poinl ar, 6haó of playcr 2 cquals llre poinó
n1, whilc alsu 1.6c lliir~l a~:óion of playcr 'l becuuics ripl.irnal. Nexl., I,hc rclaLal prubabilil.y
is iucrcasccl :wd Lhc xLraLcgY uf playcr 'l movcw Lowar~ls b1 wlrilc playcr I sl.ays aL a,
and L rernains fixed. In Lenns of res~riclcd Nash r.quilibria we dcrive. Lóal NlssAlil(I')
cyuals {q E S~qr - ar, 7z E[ax,G!]}. Wóen óhe st,ra6egy of player'l becomes cxtual lo Lz,
lhe proccdure cont,inur~s by making liis second acLion uonop4imal. 7'his sirnull.aueously
rneans óhaL Lhc pal.lr rolaled Lo playcr l rnovu~ lowards C. In óhis way tilre e~lrrilibrinrn
(C,C) is obóaiual wlrcu sLaróing frorn j~.
Analogous rca.vonings cau Lc inaclc when sLaróiug wióh prior ji. 1~'rom j~ Lhc paLh
rclal,ecl Lo player 1 rnovcs Lowards C, wlrcrc~LS Lhc sLraLcgy of playcr 'l movcs iuóo Lhc
dircr.tion of LJ. AI, t- ~, Lhc slraLcgy of playcr `l bcconus eclual Lo I! and cyual 60
Ir for playcr I. 'I'Lcn, krr playcr I also liis si.r.ond act.ion bccorncs opLimal, Llrc rclaóed
prubabilily is incrcavccl auJ liis pal,ó of sl.ralcgic~ rnovcw Luwarcls j. Mcanwlrilc, l, rctnains
consLanó and Lhc slral.cgy of tilaycr 'l slays al ll. Al j Lhc óhird acl.ion of playcr l is
rnade nonopLitnal aud óhc sórat,cgias of bo6h playcrs rnovc lowarcls lj. lu ólris manncr
the equilibrium ( L1,13) is reached.
T?valuaLing lhc abovc we may concludc 1,6e following. ln ca.gc tlrc prior p is such Lhal
2;i
Pt lies in Lhe regiou wiLh label (2,2) and Pz iu Lhe rcgion with label (l,3), it is cspecially
rolevant whether action (2,3) beconu~s optimal (irst or action (l,2). lu the [ornrer ca,ge Lhe
equilitlrium (C,C,') is selec;Led, in Lhe IaLLer case (11,13). If boLL (2,:1) and (I,'l) becorne
opLitnal aL Lhc sarnc Lirnc Lhcn equilibrium (ll, ll ) is raichcd.
Sitnilar rctnarks Irulcl for insLanccs with priurs p such Llrat pr is in regiou ('1,:1), ('l,'L)
or ('l,l), whereas ps lies iu (l,'2), (l,l), and (I,`L), respectively. In case LLe prior p is such
thaL cither pr lic~ in regiou (2,1) and pz in rcgion (I,;i), ur Pr in region ('l,;l) aud pz in
region (l,l), Lhen always Lhe Nssh equilibrium (ll,lf) is selected. "l'his also occurs in
CasC Of LIC9.
1''iually, we considcr soure dcgencratc cascs- LeL Lhc prior conccrniug buLh playcrs lir~
ou Lhe segrnenL [l.~, ll ] iu Lhc rclcvanL sLratcgY spacc. Iloth playcrs óave initially Lwo
optitnal actions, {(I,'l), (1,3)} and {('l,'l), (`l,3)}, respcctivcly. "Chus, wc necd Lo apply
Lhe logarithrnic Lracing procedure. When we projeca. Lhe related path of Nash eynilibria
we derivc LhaL I,hc path of rc~sLricLcxl Na.vh cyuilibria rnovc~ iuto Lhc rcgions rclatcd
Lo (C, C). '1'Iris because both optirnal actions will be Lreated equally, i.e., boLh paóós
inil.ially rnovc Lowarrls Lhc ruiddlc of [IJ,C,'~. OLhcr bowrdary cascs can bc avaluatcrl
sirnilarly.
'I'o swnmarire~ wc niay ngain subdividc t.hc sLraLcgY spacc into aLl,racLiun scts rnlaLcd
t.o cach of Lhc N:~tih cyuililiri:r. Wit.h Lhc infortuation cullcr,ted abovc wc dcrivc t.haL Lhc
cyuilibriurn (Il, Ll) has I,hc aLLracLion scL with IargcsL sizc.
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